I was recently asked by a reporter if the new fiduciary regulation was “needed.” The question caught me a bit off guard, because having been in “figure out how to deal with this” mode for most of the past year, I had long since moved past “why” and “if” to “when” and “how.”
After a quick pause, I responded that, more than 40 years on, it certainly bore consideration. After all, the retirement savings world has changed a lot over the past generation, and if DB plans were never quite as ubiquitous as some remember them, defined contribution plans, and IRAs — which now have more assets than the DC plans which spawned many of them — increasingly are. It’s not just those individual retirement savers, either — the plan sponsor fiduciaries that play such an integral role in critical areas like plan design and outcomes measurement need all the help they can get in these increasingly complex areas.
At some point you can’t be in this business and not know that, as in all human endeavors, there are bad actors. Generally speaking, and thankfully, they are the minority. But they are out there, and every retirement plan advisor I have ever spoken with can cite examples, frequently multiple ones, of situations they have encountered, and not always been able to fix. You can’t credibly argue there aren’t problems – only whether this particular solution is well suited to, and cost effective for, the task for which it has been presented.
And yet, while all that was known and acknowledged, like the family having grown accustomed to the walls that surround our existence, there were no clarion calls for change, certainly not of the scope and scale contemplated by the Labor Department’s fiduciary regulation.
Not that I ever bought the widely cited $17 billion figure that proponents of the regulation said (and continue to say) it was costing American savers. Nobody knows the exact figure, of course (though I’m pretty sure you won’t be close if your assumptions are predicated on the notion that all active management choices are at an advisor’s direction, and only look at IRAs, even if you do cut that result in half). But let’s say it was exaggerated by a factor of two — would a $9 billion “rip-off” have been enough to warrant redress? What if it were a “mere” $1 billion?
But is the cure “proportionate” to the ills it purports to address? I’m pretty sure it will cost more than the current projections suggest – that’s the nature of such things. However, I’ve been in this business too long not to appreciate the benefits that ERISA’s oversight can bring, and those may well be understated. That said, it would be naïve to assume that flat fees (or flat rates) are necessarily cheaper in every situation. Or that the advice that comes with those pay structures is inherently “better.” But a shift in those directions will remove what is surely at least a temptation for some. And if fewer individuals take advice at those rates, and on those conditions – well, they will almost certainly do so with a greater appreciation for what such insight is worth, even if they are unwilling to pay for it.
Though it is less than a week old, there’s a pretty consistent sense that the final regulation is more workable than its predecessor. Indeed, many would argue, considerably so. Make no mistake, the Labor Department may not have acquiesced in every comment or suggestion made over the past year, but they were clearly taking notes.
That does not, however, mean that it doesn’t still have “bugs” that have to be worked out, provisions that need to be refined, definitions that need to be clarified. We may have known this was coming, but this new fiduciary “home” has only just come on the market.
It’s not unusual for “cures” to be worse than the disease — or to at least be more costly. The fiduciary regulation may yet turn out to have unintended consequences (count on it) — or, hard as it may be to imagine right now, we may look back in a couple of years and wonder at how quickly we adjusted.
Regardless, the waiting is over. The work begins.
After a quick pause, I responded that, more than 40 years on, it certainly bore consideration. After all, the retirement savings world has changed a lot over the past generation, and if DB plans were never quite as ubiquitous as some remember them, defined contribution plans, and IRAs — which now have more assets than the DC plans which spawned many of them — increasingly are. It’s not just those individual retirement savers, either — the plan sponsor fiduciaries that play such an integral role in critical areas like plan design and outcomes measurement need all the help they can get in these increasingly complex areas.
At some point you can’t be in this business and not know that, as in all human endeavors, there are bad actors. Generally speaking, and thankfully, they are the minority. But they are out there, and every retirement plan advisor I have ever spoken with can cite examples, frequently multiple ones, of situations they have encountered, and not always been able to fix. You can’t credibly argue there aren’t problems – only whether this particular solution is well suited to, and cost effective for, the task for which it has been presented.
And yet, while all that was known and acknowledged, like the family having grown accustomed to the walls that surround our existence, there were no clarion calls for change, certainly not of the scope and scale contemplated by the Labor Department’s fiduciary regulation.
Not that I ever bought the widely cited $17 billion figure that proponents of the regulation said (and continue to say) it was costing American savers. Nobody knows the exact figure, of course (though I’m pretty sure you won’t be close if your assumptions are predicated on the notion that all active management choices are at an advisor’s direction, and only look at IRAs, even if you do cut that result in half). But let’s say it was exaggerated by a factor of two — would a $9 billion “rip-off” have been enough to warrant redress? What if it were a “mere” $1 billion?
But is the cure “proportionate” to the ills it purports to address? I’m pretty sure it will cost more than the current projections suggest – that’s the nature of such things. However, I’ve been in this business too long not to appreciate the benefits that ERISA’s oversight can bring, and those may well be understated. That said, it would be naïve to assume that flat fees (or flat rates) are necessarily cheaper in every situation. Or that the advice that comes with those pay structures is inherently “better.” But a shift in those directions will remove what is surely at least a temptation for some. And if fewer individuals take advice at those rates, and on those conditions – well, they will almost certainly do so with a greater appreciation for what such insight is worth, even if they are unwilling to pay for it.
Though it is less than a week old, there’s a pretty consistent sense that the final regulation is more workable than its predecessor. Indeed, many would argue, considerably so. Make no mistake, the Labor Department may not have acquiesced in every comment or suggestion made over the past year, but they were clearly taking notes.
That does not, however, mean that it doesn’t still have “bugs” that have to be worked out, provisions that need to be refined, definitions that need to be clarified. We may have known this was coming, but this new fiduciary “home” has only just come on the market.
It’s not unusual for “cures” to be worse than the disease — or to at least be more costly. The fiduciary regulation may yet turn out to have unintended consequences (count on it) — or, hard as it may be to imagine right now, we may look back in a couple of years and wonder at how quickly we adjusted.
Regardless, the waiting is over. The work begins.
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